#### An Intro to the Economics of Climate Policy

- What are we going to cover today?
  - Introduction to "cost-effective" policy solutions to
     CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions.
    - Develop a baseline standards approach
    - Compare two popular approaches
      - Emission taxes (carbon tax)
      - Tradable emissions permits

## **New Course this Fall!**

- ECON 445 "International Environmental Economics and Climate Change"
- Fall 2009, Tuesday & Thursday 11:10 AM 12:30 PM
- Satisfies a component of the Climate Change and Society portion of the Climate Change Studies minor.
- Topics:
  - Climate change economics
  - The economics of international trade in waste
  - Trans-boundary pollution
  - The Pollution Haven Hypothesis

## An Intro to the Economics of Climate Policy

- Stern and IPCC estimates (as well as others) of the cost of climate change mitigation are approximately 1% of world GDP per year if we are to achieve a stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations of 500-550 ppm.
- In 2008, world GDP was \$70.6 trillion...the U.S. GDP was \$14.6 trillion.
- This implies that the world will need to spend \$706 billion/year, and the U.S. needs to spend \$146 billion/ year to achieve the 550 ppm CO<sub>2</sub> concentration target.
- The estimates assume that policies to abate CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are *cost-effective*.


## **Cost-Effectiveness**

- A policy is cost-effective if it achieves a given amount of environmental improvement at the least possible aggregate cost.
- This occurs when a policy is designed such that the *marginal cost of abatement* across sources are the same (known as the equimarginal principle).

# Marginal Abatement Cost

- The marginal cost of abatement is the cost of reducing one additional unit of emissions (say 1 ton of CO<sub>2</sub>).
- The marginal abatement cost curve shows the marginal cost of reducing (abating) each unit of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

# Marginal Abatement Costs



CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

# A Standards Based Approach to Emission Reduction

- Standards can be defined in many ways, but two common approaches are technology standards and emission standards.
  - Technology standards define the technology that may be used.
  - Emission standards place a limit on emissions.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

 Let's take a look at the costs of an emission standard that calls for a 50% reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions from all sources.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0 🕽	0
7 🔰	1	10	20
6	2 5	20	60
5 5	3 5	305	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

Source A reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 8 tons/wk to the set standard of 4 tons/wk.

The cost of achieving the 50% reduction for Source A is 10 + 20 + 30 + 40 = \$100.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0	0
7 🕽	1	10	20 5
6	2 5	20	60 5
5 5	3 5	30	80 5
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

Source B reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 8 tons/wk to the set standard of 4 tons/wk.

The cost of achieving the 50% reduction for Source B is 20 + 60 + 80 + 100 = \$260.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🕽	0 🕽	0	0
7 🕽	1	10	20 5
6	2 5	20	60 5
5 5	3 5	30	80 5
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- What is the total cost of achieving a 50% reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions?
- \$100 + \$260 = \$360 per week
- Note that the marginal abatement costs are different for Source A and B.

# A CO<sub>2</sub> Emission Tax (carbon tax)

- A carbon emission tax places a tax on a unit of carbon emissions...
   effectively placing a price on pollution.
- For example, if an emissions tax of \$50 were placed on each ton of  $CO_2$  emissions and a power plant emitted 40 tons per month...they would have a tax bill (cost) of \$2000 per month.
- Firms and individuals seek to reduce costs to increase profit.
- The emission tax (if correctly priced) gives polluting sources an incentive to reduce emissions.
- Let's take a look...consider a \$65 emission tax in our previous example.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

What are *total costs* for Source A and Source B if they continue to emit 8 tons/wk?

Source A = \$0 + \$65\*8 = \$520

Source B = \$0 + \$65\*8 = \$520

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

 Do Source A and Source B have an incentive to reduce costs by reducing their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions?

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0 🕽	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0 >	0
7	1	-65 + 10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	I marginal tax savings	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🔵	0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65 + 10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8 Potential per ton	marginal tax savangs	310

<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions</b>		Marginal Aba	tement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65 + 10	20
6	2	-65 + 20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	I marginal tax savangs	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Aba	tement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65 + 10	20
6	2 5	-65 + 20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	I marginal tax savangs	310

<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions</b>		<b>Marginal Aba</b>	tement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽	0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65 + 10	20
6	2 5	-65 + 20	60
5	3	-65 + 30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	Il marginal tax savangs	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Aba	tement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8 🕽	0 🕽	0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65 + 10	20
6	2 5	-65 + 20	60
5 5	3 5	-65 + 30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8 Potentia	I marginal tax savang	310
	po. 1011		

<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions</b>		N	Marginal Ab	atement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>		Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽		0 >	0
7 🕽	1	-65	+ 10	20
6	2 5	-65	+ 20	60
5 5	3 5	-65	+ 30	80
4	4	-65	+ 40	100
3	5		50	140
2	6		60	200
1	7	•	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	Tal margina	al tax savangs	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		N	Aarginal Aba	atement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>		Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽		0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65	+ 10	20
6	2 5	-65	+ 20	60
5 5	3 5	-65	+ 30	80
4 5	4 5	-65	+ 40	100
3	5		50	140
2	6		60	200
1	7	•	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	T al margina	ıl tax sav <b>i</b> n <b>g</b> 0	310

<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions</b>		N	Marginal Ab	oatement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>		Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽		0 🕽	0
7 🕽	1	-65	+ 10	20
6	2 5	-65	+ 20	60
5 5	3 5	-65	+ 30	80
4 5	4 5	-65	+ 40	100
3	5	-65	+ 50	140
2	6		60	200
1	7	•	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	T al margina	il tax savingo	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		ľ	Aarginal Ab	atement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>		Source A	Source B
8 🔵	0 🕽		0	0
7 🕽	1	-65	+ 10	20
6	2 5	-65	+ 20	60
5 5	3 5	-65	+ 30	80
4 5	4 5	-65	+ 40	100
3	5	-65	+ 50	140
2	6		60	200
1	7		80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	nl margina	100 Il tax savings	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		N	Marginal Ab	atement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>		Source A	Source B
8	0		0	0
7 🕇	1	-65	+ 10	20
6	2 🕊	-65	+ 20	60
5 🥏	3 🥏	-65	+ 30	80
4	4 🥏	-65	+ 40	100
3 🥏	5 🔰	-65	+ 50	140
2	6	-65	+ 60	200
1	7	<b>^</b>	80	250
0	8 Potentia per ton	al margina	al tax sav <b>1</b> ng0	310

Source A reduces  $CO_2$  emissions from 8 tons/wk to 2 tons/wk when there is a \$65/ton carbon tax.

The abatement cost of achieving the reduction for Source A is 10 + 20 + 30 + 40 + 50 + 60 = \$210, and their tax bill is \$65\*2 = \$130. For total costs of \$100 + \$130 = \$340.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emission	<u>1S</u>	Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)			
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B		
8	0	0	0		
7	1	10	20		
6	2	20	60		
5	3	30	80		
4	4	40	100		
3	5	50	140		
2	6	60	200		
1	7	80	250		
0	8	100	310		

Does Source B have an incentive to reduce costs by reducing their CO<sub>2</sub> emissions?

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)			
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B		
8 🔵	0 🔵	0	0 🔵		
7	1	10	20		
6	2	20	60		
5	3	30	80		
4	4	40	100		
3	5	50	140		
2	6	60	200		
1	7	80	250		
0	8	100	310		

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)		
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source	Α	Source B
8	0 🔵	0		0 🕽
7	1	10	-65	+ 20
6	2	20		60
5	3	30		80
4	4	40		100
3	5	50		140
2	6	60		200
1	7	80	<b>^</b>	250
0	8	100 <sub>enti</sub>	 ial marginal t	ax savia 10
		per tor	1	

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)			(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	4	Source l	<u>B</u>
8 🔵	0 🔵	0		0 🕽	
7 🕽	1	10	-65	+ 20	
6	2	20		60	
5	3	30		80	
4	4	40		100	
3	5	50		140	
2	6	60		200	
1	7	80	<b>^</b>	250	
0	8		l al marginal t	ax savi <mark>ng</mark> 10	
		per ton			

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions	Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)			
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A		Source B
8	0	0		0
7 🕇	1	10	-65	+ 20
6	2 💋	20	-65	+ 60
5	3	30		80
4	4	40		100
3	5	50		140
2	6	60		200
1	7	80	<b>^</b>	250
0	8	$10Q_{ m ential}$ per ton	I marginal t	ax savi <mark>3:10</mark>

Source B reduces CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 8 tons/wk to 6 tons/wk when there is a \$65/ton carbon tax.

The abatement cost of achieving the reduction for Source B is 20 + 60 = \$80, and their tax bill is \$65\*6 = \$390. For total costs of \$80 + \$390 = \$470.

<b>CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions</b>		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

Has a \$65/ton carbon tax lead to a 50% reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions/wk? Yes!

Total abatement costs are 10 + 20 + 30 + 40 + 50 + 60 = \$210 from Source A and \$20 + \$60 = \$80 for Source B, for a total of \$290/wk.

That's right, we've achieved a 50% reduction in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions at 20% lower cost compared to the uniform standard (recall that the cost there was \$340/wk).

## Implications of the Carbon Emission Tax

- If the emission tax is set correctly, the carbon emission tax can achieve the target reduction in a cost-effective manner.
- Sources with low abatement costs will do more of the abating and pay less in taxes. Sources with high abatement costs will do less abating but pay higher taxes.
- The emission tax creates an incentive for those that are most effective (least cost) at reducing emissions to do more of the abating.
- Reduces emissions and generates tax revenues that can be used for other things (so called "double dividend").
  - Covering regulatory budgets.
  - Subsidizing consumers.
  - Returned to firms in other ways (technology subsidies, etc.)

# **Tradable Emission Permits (Cap & Trade)**

- Tradable Emission Permit programs create a 'market' for pollution by allocating permits that can be traded amongst polluters.
- Regulators set the CO<sub>2</sub> emission target and allocate (or auction) the permits to polluters.
- Suppose a polluter is allocated 8 permits (1 ton of CO<sub>2</sub> equivalent) permonth.
- Polluter has three options:
  - 1. Pollute 8 tons of CO<sub>2</sub>
  - 2. Pollute less than 8 tons and sell the extra permits
  - 3. Buy more permits and pollute greater than 8 tons

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- Is there a price at which Source A and Source B could agree to trade a permit and make themselves better off?
- Yes! Any price between \$40 and \$100 can make both firms better off.
- Let's say they agree to a price of \$65.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	<b>(</b> 40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- Source A increases abatement by 1 ton, thereby increasing abatement costs by \$50.
- But they can sell that permit they freed up for \$65...a net gain of \$15.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80 为
4	4	<b>(</b> 40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- What about Source B? They purchase a permit for \$65 from Source A (so that they now hold 5 permits), which allows them to avoid \$100 of abatement costs.
- They pay \$65 for a permit and save \$100 in costs...a net gain of \$35.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60 为
5	3	30	80 5
4	4	<b>(</b> 40	100
3	5	<b>Č</b> 50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- Should they trade another permit?
- Source A could frees up another permit for \$60 and sells for \$65...a net gain of \$5.
- Source B purchases a permit for \$65 and reduces costs by \$80...net gain=\$15

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs (\$	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60 为
5	3	30	80 5
4	4	<b>(</b> 40	100
3	5	<b>Č</b> 50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- Should they trade another permit?
- No. Source A would take a loss (\$65-\$80 = -\$15) and Source B would take a loss (\$60-\$65=-\$5).
- RESULT: 2 permits are traded at \$65 apiece.

## **Tradable Emission Permits**

- Tradable emission permits create a private property right for emissions.
- Low cost CO<sub>2</sub> abaters will increase abatement and sell permits for a profit.
- High cost CO<sub>2</sub> abaters will abate less by purchasing permits that cost less than their abatement costs.
- Result: Those sources with the low abatement costs do most of the CO2 abatement.
- Policymakers control the level of emissions through the issuance of permits!

- In the previous examples, the carbon tax and the tradable permits approach are equally effective at achieving the target goal of a 50% reduction in  $CO_2$  emissions in a cost-effective manner.
- From a policymaker or regulator's standpoint however this requires perfect information about each sources marginal abatement cost structure.
- Let's take a look at a world where the policymakers *do not* have perfect information about the marginal abatement costs of firms (countries)...

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

- With perfect information a cost effective reduction of 50% can be achieved with a \$65 carbon tax or allocating 8 permits (the market price will clear at \$65).
- As a policy maker, you are indifferent from a cost-effectiveness perspective.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	10	20
6	2	20	60
5	3	30	80
4	4	40	100
3	5	50	140
2	6	60	200
1	7	80	250
0	8	100	310

<sup>•</sup> But what if you don't know the true marginal abatement costs of the sources?

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Ab	atement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0		
7	1		
6	2		
5	3		
4	4		
3	5		
2	6		
1	7		
0	8		

- But what if you don't know the true marginal abatement costs of the sources?
- Are carbon taxes and tradable permits equally efficient in the face of uncertainty for the policymaker?

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Ab	atement Costs(\$)
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0		
7	1		
6	2		
5	3		
4	4		
3	5		
2	6		
1	7		
0	8		

• Let's begin with the carbon tax. Suppose that the policymaker made a best guess at a carbon tax of \$65.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	30	40
6	2	40	80
5	3	50	100
4	4	60	120
3	5	70	160
2	6	80	220
1	7	100	270
0	8	120	330

- Let's begin with the carbon tax. Suppose that the policymaker made a best guess at a carbon tax of \$65.
- But the true marginal abatement costs of the Sources were above.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	30 )	40
6	2	40 )	80
5	3	50	100
4	4	60	120
3	5	70	160
2	6	80	220
1	7	100	270
0	8	120	330

- Source A will abate 4 tons...abate as long as MAC < tax.
- Source B will abate 1 ton... as long as MAC < tax.</li>
- END RESULT: We're short of the 50% reduction target (5 tons abated, rather than 8)!

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0		
7	1		
6	2		
5	3		
4	4		
3	5		
2	6		
1	7		
0	8		

• Are things different with a carbon trading program?

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	30	40
6	2	40	80
5	3	50	100
4	4	60	120
3	5	70	160
2	6	80	220
1	7	100	270
0	8	120	330

- Are things different with a carbon trading program?
- Suppose each firm gets allocated 4 permits. Will they trade?
- Yes. Any price between \$60 and \$120 can make them both better off.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emissions		Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	Tons Abated	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	30	40
6	2	40	80
5	3	50	100
4	4	<b>Ç</b> 60	120
3	5	<b>Ç</b> 70	160
2	6	80	220
1	7	100	270
0	8	120	330

- Suppose the market clears in the middle at \$90 per permit.
- Source A will increase abatement and sell permits to Source B as long as the permit price > MAC.
- Source A increases abatement by 2 tons, freeing up 2 permits to sell.

CO <sub>2</sub> Emission	<u>1S</u>	Marginal Abatement Costs(\$)	
(tons/wk)	<b>Tons Abated</b>	Source A	Source B
8	0	0	0
7	1	30	40
6	2	40	80 为
5	3	50	100
4	4	<b>Ç</b> 60	120
3	5	<b>Ç</b> 70	160
2	6	80	220
1	7	100	270
0	8	120	330

- Source B will purchase permits as long as purchase price < MAC.</li>
- Source B will decrease abatement and purchase 2 permits.
- END RESULT: 50% reduction has been achieved, but permit price is higher.

- Under the Carbon Tax, the policymaker sets the price and the quantity of abatement is determined by the market.
- Under the Tradable Permits program, the policymaker sets the quantity of abatement (by controlling how many permits they allow) and the market determines the price.

#### **Pros for tax**

- No price volatility
- Revenue allows for "double-dividend"
- Can be applied at source (fewer monitoring sites. Relevant for developing countries)

# Pros for cap-&-trade

- Emissions certainty
- Can raise revenues through auctioning
- Political feasibility in countries that are "taxation-averse" (e.g. U.S.)
- Non-producing participants have a "voice" by buying and retiring permits.